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Research Article
Abstract: Public managers’ decisions are affected by cognitive biases. For instance, employees’ previous year’s 
performance ratings influence new ratings irrespective of actual performance. Nevertheless, experimental knowledge 
of public managers’ cognitive biases is limited, and debiasing techniques have rarely been studied. Using a survey 
experiment on 1,221 public managers and employees in the United Kingdom, this research (1) replicates two 
experiments on anchoring to establish empirical generalization across institutional contexts and (2) tests a consider-
the-opposite debiasing technique. The results indicate that anchoring bias replicates in a different institutional context, 
although effect sizes differ. Furthermore, a low-cost, low-intensity consider-the-opposite technique mitigates anchoring 
bias in this survey experiment. An exploratory subgroup analysis indicates that the effect of the intervention depends on 
context. The next step is to test this strategy in real-world settings.
Evidence for Practice
•	 In	survey	experiments,	anchoring	bias	is	robust	across	institutional	contexts	for	managers	as	well	as	
employees.	It	should	be	considered	when	designing	decision	environments	for	public	management	practices.
•	 Anchoring	bias	can	be	reduced	by	using	a	low-cost,	low-intensity	version	of	the	consider-the-opposite	
strategy.	This	strategy	involves	asking	for	two	reasons	why	the	anchor	is	inappropriate.	The	effectiveness	of	
this	strategy	depends	on	context	and	should	be	tested	in	real-world	settings.
•	 Consider-the-opposite	could	be	effective	in	internally	oriented	management	practices,	such	as	goal	setting	
and	performance	feedback.
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Appropriate	practices	by	public	managers	are	essential	for	public	sector	performance	and,	as	a	consequence,	for	well-functioning	
bureaucracies	(Favero,	Meier,	and	O’Toole	2016).	
However,	decisions	made	by	all	human	agents	are	
subject	to	predictable	cognitive	biases	(Tversky	and	
Kahneman	1974).	Cognitive	biases	occur	when	
“human	cognition	reliably	produces	representations	
that	are	systematically	distorted	compared	to	some	
aspect	of	objective	reality”	(Haselton,	Nettle,	and	
Murray	2015,	968).	For	instance,	people	make	
different	decisions	when	information	is	framed	
negatively	than	when	it	is	framed	positively	(Bellé,	
Cantarelli,	and	Belardinelli	2018;	Tversky	and	
Kahneman	1981).
Empirical	evidence	shows	that	public	managers	use	
cognitive	biases	in	public	sector	decision-making	
(Battaglio	et	al.	2018).	Availability	bias	and	anchoring	
bias	are	important,	for	instance,	in	macroeconomic	
forecasts	that	provide	policy	information	for	
managing	the	U.S.	economy	(Krause	2006),	framing	
matters	for	performance	evaluations	of	organizations	
and	individuals	(Belardinelli	et	al.	2018),	and	
local	election	officials’	overconfidence	in	their	
own	judgment	affects	their	technology	preferences	
(Moynihan	and	Lavertu	2012).	Despite	this	
recognition,	the	body	of	knowledge	on	the	effects	of	
cognitive	biases	on	public	managers’	decision-making	
is	still	limited.
This	article	reports	on	a	research	strategy	of	initially	
replicating	two	experiments	by	Bellé,	Cantarelli,	and	
Belardinelli	(2017,	2018)	on	cognitive	biases	in	the	
public	sector.	These	experiments	represent	two	types	
of	core	internal	management	practices	in	the	public	
sector:	goal	setting	(e.g.,	establishing	the	maximum	
number	of	days	within	which	to	respond	to	emails)	
and	performance	feedback	(e.g.,	performance	ratings)	
(Favero,	Meier,	and	O’Toole	2016;	Pedersen	and	
Stritch	2018a).
The	aim	of	this	replication	is	threefold	(Jilke	
et	al.	2017).	First,	the	replication	extends	the	
generalizability	of	earlier	results.	Experimental	results	
of	one	population	and	context	might	not	generalize	
to	another	(Lykken	1968).	That	is	why	empirical	
generalization	is	essential	to	test	the	robustness	of	
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findings	(Walker,	James,	and	Brewer	2017).	Second,	replications	
reduce	the	chance	of	false	positives	(Ioannidis	2018).	Third,	
the	influence	of	context	might	be	tested	through	replications.	
Therefore,	experiments	should	be	tested	across	politico-
administrative	contexts.
In	our	case,	most	evidence	indicates	that	anchoring	bias	is	very	
robust	across	contexts	(Furnham	and	Boo	2011).	Nevertheless,	new	
research	has	shown	that	the	effect	of	biases	might	be	dependent	
on	institutional	context	(Christensen	2018b;	Dudley	and	
Xie	2020;	Holm	2017).	In	other	words,	cognitive	processes	apply	
to	individuals,	but	they	happen	within	institutions	(Jones	2017).	
This	institutional	perspective	on	the	effects	of	cognitive	processes,	
including	biases,	remains	understudied.
Therefore,	we	are	interested	in	how	the	effects	of	cognitive	biases	
can	be	generalized	to	other	institutional	contexts.	In	this	case,	this	
research	compares	the	original	results	from	Italy	with	results	from	
the	United	Kingdom,	as	these	two	countries	represent	different	
politico-administrative	regimes	(Pollitt	and	Bouckaert	2011).	
Replications	remain	rare	in	research	even	though	the	importance	
of	replications	is	evident	(Brandt	et	al.	2014;	Pedersen	and	
Stritch	2018b;	Walker,	James,	and	Brewer	2017).	Thus,	this	article	
contributes	to	building	a	body	of	knowledge,	rather	than	relying	on	
one	experiment	to	substantiate	claims.
Further,	this	research	focuses	on	testing	a	low-intensity,	low-cost	
debiasing	technique.	The	impact	of	biases	on	decision-making	has	
led	scholars	to	suggest	that	biases	should	be	taken	into	account	when	
designing	the	architecture	of	jobs	and	tasks	(Bellé,	Cantarelli,	and	
Belardinelli	2018;	Vaughn	and	Linder	2018).	However,	in	general,	
research	demonstrating	biases	is	more	widespread	than	research	on	
solving	bias-related	problems	(Bhanot	and	Linos	2020).	It	seems	
to	be	“more	newsworthy	to	show	that	something	is	broken	than	to	
show	how	to	fix	it”	(Larrick	2004,	334).	An	explanation	for	this	is	
that	cognitive	biases	are	robust	and	debiasing	is	notoriously	difficult	
(Lilienfeld,	Ammirati,	and	Landfield	2009).	Nevertheless,	given	
the	effects	of	biases,	debiasing	has	the	potential	to	increase	public	
sector	performance,	and	therefore	it	should	be	on	the	agendas	of	
practitioners	as	well	as	researchers.	This	article	is	focused	on	testing	
a	debiasing	technique	that	can	be	easily	applied	in	practice.
This	article	concentrates	on	one	specific	cognitive	bias:	anchoring	
bias.	Anchoring	bias	refers	to	the	tendency	to	estimate	unknown	
quantities	by	using	an	initial	value	(Tversky	and	Kahneman	1974).	
This	bias	is	chosen	for	two	reasons.	First,	anchoring	bias	has	
real-world	implications	for	public	management.	Examples	are	
quantitative	evaluations	of	employees’	performance,	where	last	
year’s	employee	ratings	affect	this	year’s	ratings	(Bellé,	Cantarelli,	
and	Belardinelli	2017);	decisions	on	academic	promotions,	where	
performance	criteria	inform	decisions,	irrespective	of	performance	
(Chen	and	Kemp	2015);	negotiations,	where	initial	offers	anchor	
negotiation	outcomes	(Guthrie	and	Orr	2006);	and	evaluations,	
where	political	and	historical	performance	results	label	current	
performance	as	either	a	failure	or	success	(Holm	2017).
Second,	anchoring	is	notoriously	robust,	and	previous	attempts	
to	debias	anchoring	in	public	management	have	not	succeeded	
(Cantarelli,	Bellé,	and	Belardinelli	2018;	Furnham	and	Boo	2011).	
However,	there	is	a	promising	strategy	that	could	be	translated	into	
public	sector	practices:	consider-the-opposite.	Although	this	strategy	
has	been	tested	in	other	settings	and	has	proven	to	be	successful	
(Lord,	Lepper,	and	Preston	1984;	Mussweiler,	Strack,	and	
Pfeiffer	2000),	no	reported	experiments	exist	that	test	consider-the-
opposite	as	a	low-cost,	low-intensity	intervention	to	debias	decisions	
in	public	management.	This	leads	to	the	following	research	
question:	Does anchoring bias affect public management decisions 
across institutional contexts, and can anchoring bias in decision-making 
be mitigated through a low-cost,	low-intensity consider-the-opposite 
strategy?
The	article	is	structured	as	follows:	First,	it	elaborates	on	the	
theoretical	background	by	discussing	cognitive	biases	and	
specifically	anchoring	bias.	The	article	also	expands	on	debiasing	
techniques	and	argues	that	a	consider-the-opposite	strategy	is	an	
appropriate	strategy	for	debiasing	anchoring	effects	for	public	
management	decisions.	Second,	the	method	is	explained:	a	survey	
experiment	involving	1,221	public	managers	and	employees,	part	
of	which	is	a	replication.	Third,	the	authors	discuss	the	results	and,	
fourth,	their	implications	for	public	management	practice	and	
scholarship	are	considered.
Theoretical Framework
First,	the	article	explains	the	most	important	concepts	used	in	this	
study.
Cognitive Biases
To	understand	cognitive	biases,	it	is	necessary	to	start	with	dual	
process	theory.	Dual	process	theory	is	a	broad	cognitive	theory	
about	the	workings	of	the	human	mind	and	shows	that	people	make	
decisions	through	two	interconnected	cognitive	“systems”	(Chaiken	
and	Trope	1999;	Evans	and	Stanovich	2013;	Kahneman	2011).	
System	1	allows	people	to	make	decisions	rapidly,	automatically,	
and	intuitively.	System	1	is	the	oldest	of	the	two	systems	and	not	
exclusive	to	humans.	System	1	is	particularly	useful	in	dangerous	
situations	as	it	allows	us	to	act	without	consciously	having	to	think.	
The	other	system,	system	2,	is	slower	and	more	reflective.	Applying	
system	2,	people	can	go	beyond	our	first	hunch	and	consider	more	
complex	factors	that	may	be	relevant	to	the	problem	at	hand.
In	system	1	decisions,	shortcuts,	or	heuristics,	are	used.	Heuristics	
simplify	complex	decisions	(Tversky	and	Kahneman	1974).	In	
many	situations,	this	is	beneficial,	but	it	can	sometimes	lead	to	
systematic	biases.	Researchers	have	been	particularly	successful	
at	identifying	biases,	with	more	than	175	biases	detected	so	far	
(Benson	2016).	Notable	examples	are	status	quo	bias,	which	
refers	to	the	tendency	of	people	to	stick	to	the	current	situation	
(Kahneman,	Knetsch,	and	Thaler	1991),	and	confirmation	bias,	
which	refers	to	people	interpreting	or	looking	for	information	that	
is	concurrent	with	their	existing	beliefs	(Nickerson	1998).	Cognitive	
biases	influence	decisions	made	by	public	managers	and	employees	
(Battaglio	et	al.	2018;	Grimmelikhuijsen	et	al.	2016).
Anchoring
This	article	focuses	on	anchoring	bias.	As	noted	earlier,	anchoring	
bias	has	many	real-world	effects,	including	influencing	performance	
ratings,	and	it	is	notoriously	robust	(Bellé,	Cantarelli,	and	
Belardinelli	2017;	Furnham	and	Boo	2011).	The	current	dominant	
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view	is	that	anchoring	works	by	activating	anchor-consistent	
information	(Furnham	and	Boo	2011).	As	such,	anchoring	is	an	
association-based	bias	(Larrick	2004).	Association-based	biases	make	
some	information	more	available	in	the	mind	than	other	information	
during	decision-making,	creating	selective	accessibility	(Strack	
and	Mussweiler	1997).	In	essence,	anchoring	bias	thus	induces	a	
reference	frame	in	a	person,	a	certain	set	of	thoughts,	which	makes	it	
difficult	to	consider	alternative	possibilities	(Koehler	1991).
In	this	article,	two	earlier	anchoring	experiments	are	replicated	
(Bellé,	Cantarelli,	and	Belardinelli	2017,	2018).	These	experiments	
represent	two	core	categories	of	internal	management	practices	
(Favero,	Meier,	and	O’Toole	2016;	Pedersen	and	Stritch	2018a).	
Internally	focused	managerial	practices	aim	to	change	employees’	
behavior.	They	fall	into	four	broad	categories:	they	set	goals,	
build	trust,	increase	participation	in	decision-making,	or	provide	
performance	feedback.
The	first	experiment	illustrates	a	goal-setting	practice.	Specifically,	
the	scenario	used	here	concerns	establishing	a	maximum	number	
of	days	that	employees	have	to	respond	to	citizens’	emails	(Bellé,	
Cantarelli,	and	Belardinelli	2018).	Public	organizations	rely	on	
written	digital	communication	to	send	information	to	citizens	and	
stakeholders	(Faulkner	et	al.	2018).	Nevertheless,	decisions	about	
what	constitutes	a	timely	response	could	be	influenced	by	anchors	
that	might	be	irrelevant	(Bellé,	Cantarelli,	and	Belardinelli	2018).
The	second	experiment	focuses	on	providing	feedback	on	public	
employees’	performance	through	performance	ratings	(Bellé,	
Cantarelli,	and	Belardinelli	2017).	Performance	ratings	are	a	
common	form	of	performance	appraisal	in	the	public	sector	and	
are	widely	studied	in	public	administration.	However,	performance	
ratings	have	been	shown	to	be	prone	to	errors	and	biases	
(Tummers	2017).	Anchoring	bias	has	proven	to	be	very	robust	
across	different	contexts	(Furnham	and	Boo	2011),	and	there	is	
no	reason	to	believe	otherwise	in	the	case	of	internal	management	
practices	across	institutional	contexts.	This	leads	to	the	following	
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1:	Participants	in	the	high-anchor	replication	
groups	will	report	estimates	that	are	significantly	higher	than	
estimates	from	participants	in	low-anchor	replication	groups.
Debiasing
As	debiasing	is	fairly	novel	in	public	administration	research,	an	
overview	of	the	debiasing	literature	is	provided.	There	are	two	
main	overarching	debiasing	categories	(Croskerry,	Singhal,	and	
Mamede	2013b;	Keren	1990;	Larrick	2004;	Soll,	Milkman,	and	
Payne	2015).	One	category	includes	strategies	that	modify the 
environment,	which	either	makes	the	bias	irrelevant	or	mitigates	
its	effect.	People	could,	for	instance,	use	nudging	or	hold	public	
employees	accountable	for	their	decisions	(Aleksovska,	Schillemans,	
and	Grimmelikhuijsen	2019;	Nagtegaal	et	al.	2019).	The	second	
category	involves	modifying the decision maker,	which	can	be	done	
by	providing	education	on	the	bias	at	hand	and	the	consequences	
that	a	bias	might	have	and/or	providing	tools	to	mitigate	the	effect	
of	the	bias	(Lilienfeld,	Ammirati,	and	Landfield	2009).	Strategies	
that	modify	the	decision	maker	are	grounded	in	a	two-model	
system	of	reasoning	that	is	related	to	dual	process	theory.	This	
model	assumes	that	people	first	make	an	intuitive	judgment	about	
a	situation	with	system	1	and	that	this	judgment	can	be	corrected	
by	reflective	and	more	effortful	thinking	with	system	2	(Milkman,	
Chugh,	and	Bazerman	2009;	Morewedge	et	al.	2015).
This	article	focuses	on	modifying the decision maker	and	the	
cognitive	processes	used	to	make	a	decision.	Interventions	that	
are	informative	and	use	system	2	have	been	argued	to	preserve	
individual	dignity	by	allowing	individual	agency,	and	therefore	
they	are	preferred	by	the	people	affected	by	interventions	
(Sunstein	2016).	Not	all	strategies	that	modify	the	decision	maker	
are	equally	promising.	For	example,	Christensen	(2018a)	shows	
that	asking	for	justification	decreases	politicians’	ability	to	make	
informed	decisions.	Cantarelli,	Bellé,	and	Belardinelli	(2018)	
tested	an	educational	debiasing	intervention	in	public	service.	This	
intervention	did	not	overcome	anchoring	bias.
Others	claim	that	a	combination	of	education	and	tools	is	needed	
to	achieve	effective	debiasing	(Adame	2016;	Morewedge	et	
al.	2015;	Wilson	and	Brekke	1994).	This	can	be	very	intensive	
in	terms	of	resources	and	undesirable	in	the	public	sector,	which	
is	characterized	by	low	resources	(Lipsky	2010).	However,	
others	claim	that	offering	only	corrective	tools	could	be	effective	
(Larrick	2004).	Here,	one	strategy	seems	especially	promising	to	
debias	anchoring:	the	consider-the-opposite	strategy.	This	strategy	is	
discussed	next.
Consider-the-Opposite Strategies.	First,	it	is	important	to	realize	
that	no	debiasing	strategy	works	on	all	types	of	biases	(Croskerry,	
Singhal,	and	Mamede	2013a).	In	practice,	biases	work	through	
different	mechanisms,	and	some	biases	might	work	through	
multiple	mechanisms	at	once	(Larrick	2004).	In	this	article,	we	
attempt	to	mitigate	anchoring	bias	by	using	a	consider-the-opposite	
strategy	because	this	strategy	is	a	good	fit	for	association-based	biases	
such	as	anchoring.	By	its	nature,	anchoring	creates	a	cognitive	
reference	frame,	making	it	hard	to	consider	alternative	thoughts	
(Koehler	1991).	Consider-the-opposite	is	a	technique	to	break	
through	this	frame	and	open	the	door	to	alternative	reasoning	
(Mussweiler,	Strack,	and	Pfeiffer	2000).
The	consider-the-opposite	strategy	has	been	found	to	be	effective	
in	dealing	with	biases,	such	as	confirmation	bias	(Anderson	1982;	
Hirt	and	Markman	1995),	framing	(Cheng,	Wu,	and	Lin	2014),	
and	the	anchoring	effect	(Adame	2016;	Lord,	Lepper,	and	
Preston	1984;	Mussweiler,	Strack,	and	Pfeiffer	2000).	The	
consider-the-opposite	approach	is	administered	mostly	by	
simply	asking	people	to	list	reasons	why	the	anchor	value	is	
inappropriate	(Adame	2016;	Kennedy	1995;	Lord,	Lepper,	and	
Preston	1984;	Mussweiler,	Strack,	and	Pfeiffer	2000).	In	the	past,	
consider-the-opposite	has	been	tested,	for	example,	on	attitudes	
toward	the	death	penalty,	judging	individuals’	personality	traits	
(Lord,	Lepper,	and	Preston	1984),	probabilities	of	a	correct	
diagnosis	(Arkes	et	al.	1988),	estimating	the	value	of	a	car,	and	
estimating	the	probability	of	election	outcomes	(Mussweiler,	
Strack,	and	Pfeiffer	2000).	Our	experiment	tests	the	consider-
the-opposite	approach	on	two	scenarios	representing	two	core	
internal	management	practices	in	the	public	sector.	Moreover,	our	
experiment	uses	real	public	managers	and	employees	as	a	sample,	
increasing	the	external	validity.
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A	further	change	from	previous	studies	is	that	this	research	tests	
an	online	low-cost,	low-intensity,	and	thus	scalable,	version	of	the	
consider-the-opposite	strategy.	Previously,	most	consider-the-opposite	
experiments	have	involved	the	researcher	being	present	(Lord,	Lepper,	
and	Preston	1984;	Mussweiler,	Strack,	and	Pfeiffer	2000).	However,	
recent	research	has	shown	that	consider-the-opposite	can	work	as	
an	online	intervention,	provided	that	it	is	part	of	a	training	process	
(Adame	2016).	The	following	hypotheses	are	formulated:
Hypothesis 2:	Participants	in	the	low-anchor	consider-the-
opposite	group	will	report	estimates	that	are	higher	than	
participants	in	the	low-anchor	replication	group.
Hypothesis 3:	Participants	in	the	high-anchor	consider-
the-opposite	group	will	report	estimates	that	are	lower	than	
participants	in	the	high-anchor	replication	group.
Methodology
Experiments	frequently	require	a	trade-off	between	control	and	
internal	validity	and	external	validity	and	realism	(Druckman	et	
al.	2011).	In	this	experiment,	we	opted	for	a	controlled	design	with	
high	internal	validity.	Therefore,	we	argue	that	if	we	do	not	find	
an	effect	here,	we	probably	will	not	find	an	effect	in	more	realistic	
scenarios.	Our	two	scenarios	are	about	establishing	the	maximum	
number	of	days	within	which	an	employee	has	to	respond	to	citizens’	
inquiries	(Bellé,	Cantarelli,	and	Belardinelli	2018)	and	about	
giving	a	performance	rating	to	an	employee	(Bellé,	Cantarelli,	and	
Belardinelli	2017).	This	research	conducts	replication	experiments	
with	the	goal	of	achieving	empirical	generalization	(Walker,	James,	
and	Brewer	2017).	Consequently,	the	research	design,	measures,	and	
analysis	in	the	original	experiment	are	used.
The	original	experiments	were	administered	in	Italy.	This	experiment	
is	conducted	on	public	managers	and	employees	in	the	United	
Kingdom.	The	United	Kingdom	and	Italy	are	interesting	cases	because	
they	represent	different	politico-administrative	regimes	with	different	
histories,	rules,	and	practices.	For	instance,	these	countries	differ	
in	terms	of	many	politico-administrative	variables,	including	state	
structure	and	administrative	culture	(Pollitt	and	Bouckaert	2011).	Italy	
is	increasingly	decentralized,	whereas	the	United	Kingdom	has	a	more	
centralized	structure.	Apart	from	that,	Italy	has	been	described	as	a	mild	
adopter	of	New	Public	Management	(NPM)	practices,	which	makes	it	
a	country	in	which	managerial	and	traditional	models	are	mixed	(Nitzl,	
Sicilia,	and	Steccolini	2019).	In	contrast,	the	United	Kingdom	is	a	
heavy	adopter	of	NPM.
Specific	to	the	scenarios,	in	the	United	Kingdom,	the	provision	
of	information	to	citizens	has	been	documented	in	the	Freedom	
of	Information	Act	(FOIA)	of	2000	(Worthy	2010).	The	FOIA	
dictates	a	maximum	of	20	days	for	responding	to	citizens’	
requests	for	most	governmental	organizations	(Information	
Commissioner’s	Office	2019).	In	Italy,	a	FIOA	was	passed	in	
2016,	establishing	a	maximum	of	30	days	to	respond	(Repubblica.
it	2016).	The	original	studies	were	conducted	in	Italy	just	after	
adoption	of	the	FIOA	law	in	June–July	2016	(Bellé,	Cantarelli,	
and	Belardinelli	2017,	2018).
Concerning	the	performance	feedback	scenario,	both	the	United	
Kingdom	and	Italy	use	performance	assessments	and	feedback	as	a	
regular	part	of	human	resource	practices	(OECD	2012a,	2012b).	
Both	countries	use	performance	criteria	such	as	interpersonal	
skills,	activities	undertaken,	and	improvement	of	competencies.	
In	both	countries,	performance	assessments	are	of	high	
importance	for	remuneration	and	career	advancement.	As	such,	
performance	feedback	is	relevant	in	Italy	as	well	as	the	United	
Kingdom.	Nevertheless,	differences	also	exist.	As	stated	earlier,	
Italy	and	the	United	Kingdom	differ	in	their	adoption	of	NPM	
practices.	Research	has	shown	that	NPM	can	affect	the	ways	
in	which	performance	information	is	used	(Nitzl,	Sicilia,	and	
Steccolini	2019).	This	makes	the	United	Kingdom	an	interesting	
case	with	which	to	assess	empirical	generalization.
The	study	was	conducted	using	the	crowdsourcing	tool	Prolific.	
Crowdsourcing	refers	to	the	use	people	participating	in	an	online	
environment	to	complete	a	variety	of	tasks	(Sheehan	2018).	The	
benefits	of	crowdsourcing	are	large-scale	recruitment	of	participants	
in	a	short	time,	low	costs,	and	access	to	a	broader	population.	
The	downsides	are	a	lack	of	control	over	the	context	in	which	the	
respondent	takes	the	survey,	loss	of	naivety,	and	possibly	ethical	
problems	because	no	set	standards	for	payment	exist	(Palan	and	
Schitter	2018;	Shank	2016).	Prolific,	however,	has	been	designed	
with	the	academic	community	in	mind	and	therefore	addresses	
these	downsides,	for	instance,	by	not	allowing	researchers	to	pay	less	
than	an	established	minimum	wage.
We	used	the	prescreening	option	on	Prolific	to	select	people	from	
the	United	Kingdom	who	are	public	employees.	To	get	paid,	
the	participants	had	to	complete	the	whole	study.	We	used	the	
“forced	response”	option	in	Qualtrics	so	that	participants	could	
not	continue	with	the	survey	unless	the	questions	were	answered.	
This	resulted	in	1,221	respondents	who	were	randomized	and	
1,202	respondents	who	finished	the	whole	survey.	The	percentage	
of	missing	data	is	thus	very	small	(1.5	percent).	Cases	with	missing	
values	for	either	the	grouping	variable	or	the	dependent	variable	
were	excluded	from	the	analysis	of	that	dependent	variable.
Replications	need	a	highly	powered	sample	to	confirm	that	the	
effect	of	the	original	study	is	significant	(Brandt	et	al.	2014).	The	
sample	size	was	chosen	based	on	a	pilot	experiment	of	the	whole	
study,	involving	16	people.	Based	on	this	pilot,	a	power	analysis	was	
conducted,	which	led	to	an	estimation	of	282	respondents	needed	
per	group	to	corroborate	a	one-tailed	hypothesis	for	our	smallest	
effect	(Cohen’s	d	=	0.21).	This	was	in	line	with	the	sample	size	of	
the	original	experiments.
The	debiasing	intervention	is	based	on	earlier	consider-the-opposite	
experiments	(Adame	2016;	Lord,	Lepper,	and	Preston	1984;	
Mussweiler,	Strack,	and	Pfeiffer	2000).	Respondents	were	asked	to	
state	two	reasons	why	the	anchor	is	inappropriate.	The	direction	in	
which	the	anchor	was	inappropriate	was	specified.	In	other	words,	if	
the	anchor	was	too	low,	people	were	asked	to	explain	why	the	anchor	
was	too	low.	If	the	anchor	was	too	high,	people	were	asked	to	state	why	
it	was	too	high.	Therefore,	the	intervention	was	simple,	low	cost,	and	
low	intensity,	and	it	could	be	applied	even	when	the	researcher	was	not	
present.	All	scenarios	and	interventions	are	shown	in	the	appendix.
Two	considerations	were	important	in	designing	our	intervention.	
First,	asking	for	a	large	number	of	reasons	has	been	shown	to	be	
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countereffective,	as	participants	who	have	trouble	generating	new	
reasons	might	come	to	the	conclusion	that	the	anchor	was	right	all	
along	(Larrick	2004).	Sanna,	Schwarz,	and	Stocker	(2002)	showed	
that	requiring	two	reasons	was	effective	in	decreasing	hindsight	
bias,	while	listing	10	reasons	was	not.	Based	on	this,	six	informal	
consultations	were	conducted	in	which	the	scenarios	were	presented	
to	academics	and	public	employees.	They	were	asked	to	state	
three	reasons	why	the	anchor	was	inappropriate.	The	rapidness	
of	responses	was	considered.	If	the	third	reason	was	preceded	by	
a	pause,	the	difficulty	of	coming	up	with	the	third	reason	was	
discussed.	In	general,	respondents	took	more	time	to	generate	the	
third	reason	and	responded	by	saying	that	the	first	two	were	easy	
but	the	third	reason	was	more	difficult.	Second,	the	direction	in	
which	the	anchor	was	inappropriate	was	specified,	as	this	has	been	
shown	to	be	more	effective	than	asking	people	to	list	reasons	in	
general	(Chapman	and	Johnson	1999).	Earlier	research	showed	
that	justification	is	not	sufficient	(Belardinelli	et	al.	2018)	and	
that	respondents	need	to	allow	opposing	thoughts	in	order	for	the	
intervention	to	work.
The	experiment	has	four	groups.	The	first	and	second	groups	
replicate	the	experiments	reported	in	Bellé,	Cantarelli,	and	
Belardinelli	(2017)	and	Bellé,	Cantarelli,	and	Belardinelli	(2018),	
respectively,	to	determine	the	extent	to	which	the	biases	they	
revealed	exist	in	a	U.K.	context.	These	groups	are	labeled	the	low	
and	high anchor	replication	groups.	Our	replications	are	registered	
under	https://osf.io/mye2h/	on	the	Open	Science	Framework	
and	use	the	materials	of	the	original	authors	as	well	as	Brandt	et	
al.’s	(2014)	replication	recipe.	The	third	and	fourth	groups	test	
the	effect	of	consider-the-opposite	approaches	to	debias	anchoring	
effects.	These	groups	are	labeled	the	high	and	low consider-the-
opposite	groups.	The	setup	is	shown	in	figure	1.
The	dependent	variables	were	the	maximum	number	of	days	in	
which	employees	must	respond	to	an	email	and	the	performance	
score	on	a	0–100	scale.	To	check	that	our	randomization	was	
working	correctly,	we	included	managerial	status,	gender,	industry	
of	employment,	educational	background,	and	age	in	our	experiment	
(Bellé,	Cantarelli,	and	Belardinelli	2017,	2018).
Analysis
First,	the	high	and	low	replication	groups	are	compared	with	a	t-test	
(testing	hypothesis	1).	The	replication	is	successful	if	a	significant	
difference	is	obtained	in	the	same	direction	as	the	original	trial.	
Effect	sizes	are	compared	using	Borenstein	et	al.	(2009)	with	
a	Z-test.	Second,	again	using	t-tests,	the	replication	groups	are	
compared	with	the	corresponding	high	and	low	consider-the-
opposite	debiasing	groups.	Debiasing	is	effective	if	the	mean	of	
the	low	consider-the-opposite	group	is	significantly	higher	than	
the	low-anchor	group	and	is	obtained	(hypothesis	2)	and/or	if	the	
high	consider-the-opposite	group	report	significantly	lower	means	
than	the	high-anchor	group	(hypothesis	3).	Significance	levels	are	
established	at	0.017	and	corrected	by	the	Bonferroni	correction	per	
experiment	(0.05/3).	We	also	conducted	an	exploratory	subgroup	
analysis	of	managers	and	employees.	Data	and	materials	are	available	
on	https://osf.io/mye2h/.
All	effect	sizes	are	calculated	using	Lakens	(2013).	The	magnitude	
of	the	effect	sizes	is	reported	in	accordance	with	Sawilowsky	(2009).	
Sawilowsky	(2009)	expanded	the	reporting	of	effect	sizes	by	
including	reports	of	very	small	d	(.01),	very	large	(1.2),	and	
extremely	large	effects	(2.0),	in	addition	to	effect	sizes	as	developed	
by	Cohen.	He	did	this	as	a	reaction	to	Cohen’s	warning	about	an	
inflexible	approach	to	effect	sizes,	leading	to	Cohen’s	original	values	
to	become	standards.	Sawilowsky	(2009)	also	wanted	to	describe	
more	effect	sizes	as	observed	in	reality.
Results
Our	randomization	checks	showed	no	differences	based	on	sector,	
manager,	gender,	or	age.	However,	the	checks	did	reveal	a	small	
Figure 1 Experimental Design and Flow
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Figure 2 Means of Experiment 1 and Bellé, Cantarelli, and 
Belardinelli (2018) in Days
difference	between	educational	backgrounds.	All	the	descriptives	for	
each	group	are	shown	in	table	1.
The	results	of	experiments	1	and	2	support	the	first	hypothesis,	
that	participants	in	the	high-anchor	replication	groups	will	report	
estimates	that	are	significantly	higher	than	the	estimates	from	
participants	in	the	low-anchor	replication	groups.	This	indicates	
that	anchors	can	affect	managerial	decisions	concerning	goal	setting	
and	performance	feedback.	In	experiment	1,	public	managers	and	
employees	were	asked	to	report	the	maximum	number	of	days	
within	which	a	public	employee	should	reply	to	inquiries	from	
citizens	(replicating	Bellé,	Cantarelli,	and	Belardinelli	2018).	Here,	
the	replication	was	successful:	the	mean	score	for	the	low-anchor	
condition	(M	=	3.69,	SD	=	2.98,	N	=	306)	was	significantly	lower	
(t[316]	=	16.93,	p	=	.00)	than	the	score	for	the	high-anchor	condition	
(M	=	23.73,	SD	=	20.46,	N	=	305).	However,	the	effect	size	differs	
from	the	original	study.	The	original	study	showed	a	medium	effect	
size	(Cohen’s	d	=	0.41),	whereas	in	the	current	study,	the	effect	is	
very	large	(Cohen’s	d	=	1.37).	Furthermore,	the	mean	minima	and	
maxima	differ	from	the	original	experiment.	Bellé,	Cantarelli,	and	
Belardinelli	(2018)	reported	a	low-anchor	mean	of	31.82	and	a	high-
anchor	mean	of	53.07.	Our	means	(3.69,	23.73)	indicate	a	shift	of	
approximately	30	absolute	points	in	the	U.K.	context.	The	means	of	
the	replication	groups	of	experiment	1	are	shown	in	figure	2.
Table 1 Descriptives and Differences per Group per Condition
Low CTO Low CTO High High All
% female 80.5 78.4 78.2 78.1 78.8
% manager 32.2 30.2 32.7 29.7 31.2
Average age 39.41 39.34 39.19 38.88 39.21
Sector of employment
% health care 23.5 22.6 25.1 22.5 23.4
% education 41.0 41.0 39.6 42.8 41.1
% administration 15.6 13.4 16.8 13.4 14.8
% other 19.9 23.0 18.5 21.2 20.6
Educational background*
% technical and scientific degree 22.5 24.3 28.1 32.4 26.8
% social and humanities degree 45.9 48.2 46.9 48.4 47.3
Notes: The differences between groups were tested through chi-square tests 
apart from the difference in average age, which was calculated using an ANOVA. 
Significant differences (< 0.05) are indicated by an asterisk. CTO = consider-the-
opposite.
In	experiment	2,	public	managers	and	employees	were	asked	to	
rate	the	performance	of	an	employee	(replicating	Bellé,	Cantarelli,	
and	Belardinelli	2017).	In	experiment	2,	the	replication	was	also	
successful:	the	mean	rating	for	the	low-anchor	condition	(M	=	69.69,	
SD	=	10.18,	N	=	306)	was	significantly	lower	(t[595]	=	24.27,	
p	=	.000)	than	the	rating	for	the	high-anchor	condition	(M	=	88.24,	
SD	=	8.68,	N	=	306).	In	this	experiment,	the	means	were	very	
similar	to	those	in	the	original	research	in	that	Bellé,	Cantarelli,	and	
Belardinelli	(2017)	reported	a	low-anchor	mean	of	71.07	and	a	high-
anchor	mean	of	88.47.	Nevertheless,	the	effect	size	differed.	In	the	
original	study,	the	effect	size	was	very	large	(Cohen’s	d	=	1.21).	In	this	
study,	the	effect	could	be	labeled	extremely	large	(Cohen’s	d	=	1.96).	
The	Z-tests	provide	Z-scores	of	−7.69	for	the	goal-setting	experiment	
(p	=	.000)	and	−5.69	for	the	performance	rating	experiment	
(p	=	.000).	This	means	that	the	effect	sizes	of	the	original	studies	
differ	significantly	of	those	of	the	replication	studies.	The	means	of	
the	replication	groups	for	experiment	2	are	shown	in	figure	2.
The	second	hypothesis,	that	participants	in	the	low-anchor	
consider-the-opposite	group	will	report	estimates	that	are	higher	
than	participants	in	the	low-anchor	replication	group,	was	also	
corroborated.	This	means	that	consider-the-opposite	interventions	
can	indeed	debias	goal-setting	and	performance	feedback	practices.	
Our	consider-the-opposite	intervention	significantly	increased	
(M	=	5.2,	SD	=	4.04,	N	=	298)	(t[545]	=	5.20,	p	=	.000)	estimates	
from	the	low-anchor	group	in	experiment	1	(low-anchor	values	
M	=	3.69,	SD	=	2.98,	N	=	306).	The	effect	size	is	medium	(Cohen’s	
d	=	0.43).	Figure	2	shows	the	differences	between	the	consider-
the-opposite	group	and	the	low-anchor	group	in	experiment	1.	In	
experiment	2,	our	consider-the-opposite	intervention	significantly	
increased	(M	=	71.73,	SD	=	7.17,	N	=	297)	(t[549]	=	2.85,	p	=	.005)	
estimates	for	the	low-anchor	group	(low-anchor	values	M	=	69.69,	
SD	=	10.18,	N	=	306).	This	is	a	small	effect	size	(Cohen’s	d	=	0.23).	
Figure	3	shows	the	differences	between	the	consider-the-opposite	
group	and	the	low-anchor	group	in	experiment	2.
Our	results	further	support	hypothesis	3,	that	participants	in	
the	high-anchor	consider-the-opposite	group	will	report	lower	
estimates	than	participants	in	the	high-anchor	replication	group.	
The	consider-the-opposite	intervention	produced	significantly	lower	
(t[567]	=	−3.192,	p	=	.001)	estimates	(M	=	19.00,	SD	=	15.59,	
N	=	295)	than	the	high-anchor	group	(high-anchor	values	
M	=	23.73,	SD	=	20.46,	N	=	305)	for	experiment	1.	This	is	a	
small	effect	size	(Cohen’s	d	=	0.26).	The	consider-the-opposite	
intervention	also	significantly	lowered	(t[600]	=	−9.31,	p	=	.000)	
performance	ratings	(M	=	81.56,	SD	=	8.93,	N	=	296)	compared	
with	the	high-anchor	group	(high-anchor	value	M	=	88.24,	
SD	=	8.68,	N	=	306)	for	experiment	2.	Here,	the	effect	size	is	large	
(Cohen’s	d	=	0.76).	Figure	3	shows	the	results	of	experiment	2.
The	sample	consists	of	managers	and	employees.	Even	though	we	
did	not	hypothesize	differences	between	these	groups	beforehand,	
we	conducted	exploratory	subgroup	analyses.	These	analyses	
indicate	that	managers	as	well	as	employees	were	susceptible	
to	anchors	in	both	scenarios.	For	the	consider-the-opposite	
intervention,	we	found	that	the	effect	depends	on	context.	More	
specifically,	we	found	that	the	consider-the-opposite	intervention	
worked	for	the	high	anchor	in	the	performance	feedback	scenario	
and	the	low	anchor	in	the	goal-setting	scenario	for	managers.	For	
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the	high-anchor	goal-setting	scenario,	managers	did	not	significantly	
adjust	their	reports	while	employees	did.	For	the	low-anchor	
performance	rating,	however,	the	opposite	effect	occurred,	and	
managers	did	significantly	adjust	their	anchors	while	the	employees	
did	not.	In	tables	A1	and	A2	in	the	appendix,	all	results	of	the	
exploratory	subgroup	analyses	are	shown.
Discussion
Recent	research	has	shown	that	decisions	by	public	managers	are	
affected	by	cognitive	biases.	However,	there	is	room	to	strengthen	
this	body	of	knowledge,	and,	further,	strategies	to	mitigate	these	
biases	are	rarely	studied.	This	article	replicates	two	experiments	
representing	two	core	internal	management	practices	in	a	distinct	
institutional	context.	It	shows	how	anchoring	bias,	one	of	the	most	
robust	of	the	biases	identified,	can	be	mitigated	in	the	public	sector	
by	using	a	low-cost,	low-intensity,	and	thus	scalable,	consider-the-
opposite	strategy.	This	article	has	several	implications.
First,	anchoring	bias	replicates	across	institutional	contexts	in	our	
experiment.	This	empirically	generalizes	earlier	findings	(Bellé,	
Cantarelli,	and	Belardinelli	2017,	2018;	Walker,	James,	and	
Brewer	2017).	Nevertheless,	statistical	significance	and	effect	direction	
only	tell	a	part	of	the	story.	Effect	sizes	are	vital	when	considering	
replications	(Patil,	Peng,	and	Leek	2016).	Anchoring	effects	in	the	
current	study	are	significantly	larger	compared	with	the	original	
study.	For	instance,	for	the	experiment	on	goal	setting,	in	the	
United	Kingdom,	a	very	large	effect	was	found,	compared	with	a	
medium	effect	in	the	original	Italian	study	(Bellé,	Cantarelli,	and	
Belardinelli	2018).	Furthermore,	the	mean	minima	and	maxima	shifted	
by	about	30	absolute	points	compared	with	the	original	study.	The	
differences	in	effects	between	Italy	and	the	United	Kingdom	could	
be	explained	by	multiple	factors,	including	the	survey,	timing,	and	
language.	Our	survey,	for	instance,	exclusively	focused	on	anchoring,	
while	in	the	original	experiments,	the	scenarios	were	part	of	a	lengthier	
survey	in	which	different	biases	were	tested.	Political	reference	levels	
also	could	have	caused	different	effects	for	the	goal-setting	scenario	
(Holm	2017).	In	other	words,	existing	anchors	such	as	the	maximum	
number	of	days	required	by	FOIA	laws	might	influence	the	effect	
of	anchors.	Political	reference	levels	could	give	an	indication	of	the	
“right”	answer,	limiting	the	influence	of	anchors	as	a	cue	of	important	
information	on	decision-making	(Furnham	and	Boo	2011).	Apart	
from	that,	other	characteristics	of	the	law	could	have	an	effect.	The	
U.K.	FIOA	law	has	been	in	place	since	2000,	while	the	Italy	law	was	
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Figure 3 Means of Experiment 2 and Bellé, Cantarelli, and 
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accepted	in	2016.	While	the	law	has	been	relatively	successful	in	the	
United	Kingdom,	in	Italy,	the	effects	of	the	FOIA	on	citizens	requests	
remain	contested	(Diritto	di	Sapere	2017;	Worthy	2010).	As	such,	the	
age	of	the	laws,	the	knowledge	of	the	laws	and	when	to	apply	them,	as	
well	as	compliance	with	laws	might	affect	anchoring	bias.
Second,	our	consider-the-opposite	strategy	achieved	the	desired	
outcome	in	all	four	cases.	Nevertheless,	the	effect	sizes	ranged	from	
small	to	large.	This	indicates	that	the	effectiveness	of	consider-the-
opposite	strategies	varies	case	by	case.	This	research	shows	that	
consider-the-opposite	is	most	effective	in	situations	in	which	a	high	
anchor	is	presented.	In	these	cases,	the	anchor	could	be	considered	
more	extreme.	Some	authors	claim	that	extreme	anchors	lead	to	
a	larger	anchoring	effect	than	anchors	that	are	more	reasonable	
(Furnham	and	Boo	2011).	On	top	of	that,	our	consider-the-opposite	
intervention	does	not	fully	remove	the	influence	of	anchoring,	which	
may	imply	that	anchoring	bias	is	hard	to	remove	completely	with	
debiasing	interventions	such	as	the	consider-the-opposite	strategy.	The	
latter	could	be	explained	by	different	reasons	for	a	person	to	follow	an	
anchor	(Furnham	and	Boo	2011).	For	instance,	people	could	perceive	
the	anchor	as	being	relevant	to	the	problem	at	hand.	Subsequently,	
consider-the-opposite	might	only	target	some	of	the	causes.
Third,	our	subgroup	analyses	indicate	that	anchoring	has	an	effect	
on	both	managers	and	employees.	The	effect	of	our	consider-the-
opposite	intervention	nevertheless	depends	on	context.	For	instance,	
managers	adjust	goal	setting	when	asked	to	listed	reasons	why	the	low	
anchor	is	inappropriate.	Managers	however	do	not	adjust	goal	setting	
for	the	high	anchor.	On	top	of	that,	employees	lower	their	judgment	
when	asked	to	consider	the	opposite	in	the	case	of	a	high	anchor	
and	move	toward	a	level	comparable	with	the	managers’	reports.	
This	might	indicate	that	managers	already	reflect	more	critically	on	
the	high	anchor	or	have	a	clearer	view	of	political	reference	levels,	
such	as	FIOA	laws	(Holm	2017).	The	opposite	effect	occurs	for	the	
performance	feedback	scenarios.	In	case	of	a	low	anchor,	employees	do	
not	significantly	adjust	their	ratings	after	consider-the-opposite,	while	
managers	do.	For	the	high	anchor,	both	groups	adjust	their	ratings.
Fourth,	as	our	research	offers	a	successful	low-cost,	low-intensity	
intervention	that	can	easily	be	applied	in	public	services,	the	
next	step	would	be	to	translate	this	method	to	real	public	
management	practices.	A	couple	of	difficulties	arise	in	doing	so.	
First,	determining	the	number	of	reasons	to	be	provided	is	crucial,	
and	this	might	differ	in	each	case.	This	requires	a	case-by-case	
approach.	Our	general	advice	is	to	not	require	too	many	reasons	as	
this	can	backfire	(Sanna,	Schwarz,	and	Stocker	2002).	Nevertheless,	
provided	an	adequate	number	of	reasons	is	established,	a	consider-
the-opposite	approach	could	possibly	be	institutionalized	in	formal	
and	informal	ways	(Secunda	2012).	This	brings	us	to	the	second	
concern:	asking	managers	and	employees	to	formally	write	down	
reasons	why	the	anchor	is	inappropriate	might	induce	a	sense	of	
accountability,	which	could	have	an	effect	in	itself	(Aleksovska,	
Schillemans,	and	Grimmelikhuijsen	2019).
Fifth,	the	consider-the-opposite	strategy	could	also	be	applied	to	
counteract	other	association-based	biases,	such	as	confirmation	bias	
and	hindsight	bias	(Larrick	2004).	Additionally,	a	consider-the-
opposite	approach	could	be	adapted	to	other	internal	management	
practices	in	the	public	sector	such	as	practices	to	build	trust	or	
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increase	participation	in	decision-making	(Favero,	Meier,	and	
O’Toole	2016;	Pedersen	and	Stritch	2018a).	Furthermore,	possible	
applications	are	related	to	street-level	decisions	such	as	during	
client-employee	interactions,	where	associations	concerning	client	
deservingness	are	known	to	play	a	role	(Guthrie	and	Orr	2006;	Jilke	
and	Tummers	2018;	Schafer	and	Schafer	2018).
Conclusions
This	survey	experiment	investigated	whether	anchoring	bias	
replicates	in	decisions	representing	internal	management	practices	
across	institutional	contexts,	the	relevance	of	the	anchoring	effect	
among	managers	and	employees,	and	whether	public	managers	and	
employees	can	be	debiased	by	a	low-cost,	low-intensity	consider-
the-opposite	intervention.
Limitations
Our	research	inevitably	has	limitations.	The	main	limitation	of	this	
research	is	that	the	experiments	focused	on	control	and	internal	
validity,	as	they	were	conducted	through	an	online	sample	based	
on	simplified	fictional	scenarios	(Bouwman	and	Grimmelikhuijsen	
2016;	Harrison	et	al.	2004).	Real-world	scenarios	might	differ	and	
involve	more	information	or	more	complexity.	This	could	affect	
anchoring	bias	and	the	consider-the-opposite	strategy	on	decision-
making.	The	effect	of	anchoring	bias	and	consider-the-opposite	
could,	for	instance,	be	smaller	in	a	real-world	scenario.	Even	though	
these	limitations	exist,	our	scenarios	are	externally	relevant	for	two	
reasons.	First,	anchoring	bias	proves	to	be	robust	across	a	variety	of	
experimental	manipulations	and	contextual	factors	(Furnham	and	
Boo	2011).	Even	if	anchors	are	self-generated,	people	do	not	adjust	
their	estimates	sufficiently	(Epley	and	Gilovich	2001).	On	top	of	
that,	increased	understanding	of	the	problem	at	hand	does	not	
discard	anchoring	bias.	Experts	are	susceptible	to	anchoring	bias,	
too	(Englich,	Mussweiler,	and	Strack	2006;	Guthrie	and	Orr	2006).	
Our	subgroup	analyses	also	indicate	that	the	anchoring	effect	is	
relevant	for	managers	as	well	as	employees.	For	the	consider-the-
opposite	intervention,	we	have	less	empirical	knowledge	relating	
to	the	generalizability	of	the	consider-the-opposite	strategy.	The	
subgroup	analyses	indicate	that	the	effectiveness	of	the	consider-the-
opposite	strategy	depends	on	context.	This	subgroup	analysis	should	
be	interpreted	with	caution,	however,	as	it	is	correlational	in	nature	
and	we	lack	power	to	detect	small	effects	(Gerber	and	Green	2012).
Another	limitation	of	our	research	could	be	the	use	of	the	term	“bias,”	
which	implies	the	relationship	of	a	cognitive	shortcut	to	negative	
outcomes.	This	has	generated	criticisms	by	Gigerenzer	and	coauthors	
(Gigerenzer	and	Goldstein	1996;	Gigerenzer	et	al.	2008;	Gigerenzer	
1991),	for	instance.	The	main	criticism	of	Gigerenzer	and	colleagues	
is	that	cognitive	biases	are	tools	for	humans	that	help	decision-making	
instead	of	impairing	it	(see	also	Vis	2019).	This	relates	to	discussions	
on	what	constitutes	rationality.	In	the	tradition	of	Kahneman	and	
Tversky,	heuristics	can	lead	to	suboptimal	decisions	compared	
with	a	normative	standard,	oftentimes	in	line	with	expected	utility	
theory.	In	the	Gigerenzer	tradition,	heuristics	allow	people	to	make	
decisions	that	fit	the	environment.	Although	a	thorough	discussion	
of	rationality	relating	to	heuristics	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article	
(discussions	include	Kahneman	and	Tversky	1996;	Samuels,	Stich,	and	
Bishop	2002;	Stanovich	2011),	two	important	points	of	this	discussion	
should	be	emphasized.	First,	heuristics	are	not	inherently	bad	or	good,	
but	their	merit	depends	on	context	(Gigerenzer	and	Brighton	2009;	
Tversky	and	Kahneman	1974).	Second,	the	discussion	of	heuristics	
is,	in	the	end,	a	normative	discussion	that	relies	on	philosophical	
questions	(Hands	2014).	Therefore,	in	this	article,	expected	utility	
theory	is	assumed	as	a	normative	ideal.	Scholars	are	invited	to	use	other	
normative	standards	to	interpret	the	results	of	this	study.
We	draw	three	main	conclusions	and	propose	directions	for	future	
research.	First,	anchoring	is	relevant	across	institutional	contexts.	Future	
research	could	explore	whether	there	is	an	interaction	with	the	effect	of	
institutions,	or	more	specifically	rules	and	expectations,	on	the	effect	of	
cognitive	biases.	Second,	anchoring	bias	has	an	effect	on	both	managers	
and	employees,	as	such	being	a	manager	does	not	remove	anchoring	
bias.	Third,	a	consider-the-opposite	strategy	can	mitigate	anchoring	
effects	in	our	goal-setting	and	performance	feedback	scenarios.	
This	strategy	consists	of	requesting	two	reasons	why	the	anchor	is	
inappropriate.	Effectiveness,	however,	depends	on	at	least	on	two	
contextual	factors.	First,	effects	seem	stronger	when	anchors	are	more	
extreme.	Future	research	could	also	specify	to	what	extent	the	perception	
of	extremeness	matter,	for	instance	by	asking	whether	respondents	
find	specific	anchors	too	low	or	too	high.	Second,	managers	might	
react	differently	to	the	consider-the-opposite	strategy	than	employees.	
Managers	for	instance	could	have	more	knowledge	of	relevant	laws.	On	
the	other	hand,	managers	can	be	debiased	in	other	cases.	Future	research	
could	focus	solely	on	managers	for	the	aforementioned	scenarios.	This	
strategy	has	the	potential	to	be	used	to	address	other	association-based	
biases,	as	well	as	with	other	internal	management	practices	and	other	
types	of	employees	such	as	street-level	bureaucrats.
The	practical	implications	of	this	research	are	that	anchoring	should	
be	taken	seriously	in	public	management	contexts,	and	could	
influence	goal-setting	and	performance	feedback	practices.	Therefore,	
it	should	be	considered	when	designing	jobs	and	tasks.	Apart	from	
that,	our	research	indicates	that	in	cases	in	which	anchoring	bias	
is	a	problem,	a	consider-the-opposite	strategy	is	a	promising	tool	
to	mitigate	anchoring	bias.	This	research	should	be	seen	as	a	first	
step	toward	mitigating	anchoring	bias.	The	next	step	is	to	test	it	
in	real-world	scenarios.	As	this	research	has	shown	that	anchoring	
bias	can	work	differently	depending	on	context	and	a	consider-the-
opposite	technique	mitigates	anchoring	bias	in	a	controlled	setting,	we	
encourage	scholars	to	test	these	results	in	more	realistic	settings.	Future	
research	should	therefore	focus	on	real-world	scenarios	prone	to	biases	
and	field	experiments	to	test	the	consider-the-opposite	strategy.
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Appendix—Conditions for Each Experiment
Experiment 1: Bellé, Cantarelli, and Belardinelli (2018).
You	are	the	senior	manager	of	the	Public	Relations	Office	in	a	medium-sized	municipality.	You	have	to	decide	the	maximum	number	of	
days	by	which	your	subordinates	have	to	reply	to	citizens’	inquiries	sent	via	emails.	Consider	whether	the	maximum	number	of	days	to	
reply	to	citizens’	emails	must	be	higher	or	lower	than	2[90]	working	days.
Consider-the-opposite.
To	make	this	decision,	please	first	list	two	reasons	why	2[90]	days	might	be	too	short[long]	to	respond	to	citizens’	emails.
•	 Reason	1	________________________________________________
•	 Reason	2	________________________________________________
Now,	indicate	the	maximum	number	of	days	to	reply	to	citizens’	emails	below.
Experiment 2: Bellé, Cantarelli, and Belardinelli (2017).
Imagine	that	you	have	to	assess	this	year’s	performance	of	a	subordinate	of	yours.	During	this	year,	your	subordinate	met	the	majority	of	
goals,	had	good	interpersonal	skills	with	her	colleagues,	and	showed	moderate	creativity	in	proposing	new	ideas	for	the	improvement	of	the	
services.
The	previous	year,	you	assigned	your	subordinate	a	performance	rating	of	51/100[91/100].	You	have	to	decide	whether	to	assign	a	rating	
lower	or	higher	than	51/100[91/100].
Consider-the-opposite.
To	make	this	decision,	please	first	list	two	reasons	why	51/100[91/100]	might	be	too	low[high]	a	rating	for	the	employee’s performance this 
year.
•	 Reason	1	________________________________________________
•	 Reason	2	________________________________________________
Now,	indicate	how	would	you	assess	your	subordinate	on	a	scale	from	0–100:
Results	of	Exploratory	Subgroup	Analysis
Table A1 Subgroup Analysis Goal-Setting Experiment
Managers Employees
Replication Low CTO High CTO Replication Low CTO High CTO
t-score 9.29*** 3.39** −.37 14.55*** 4.17*** −3.39**
Cohen’s d 1.42 0.50 .00 1.39 0.41 0.33
n 189 186 184 422 418 416
M(SD)
Low 3.42 (2.13) 3.42 (2.13) 3.82 (3.30) 3.82 (3.30)
High 18.80 (15.58) 18.80 (15.58) 25.80 (21.89) 25.80 (21.89)
Low CTO 4.69 (2.94) 5.41 (4.41)
High CTO 17.97 (15.25) 19.48 (15.77)
*** p < .001; ** p < .01.
Table A2 Subgroup Analysis Performance Feedback Experiment
Managers Employees
Replication Low CTO High CTO Replication Low CTO High CTO
t-score 16.94*** 2.58* −6.95*** 18.26*** 1.63 −6.58***
Cohen’s d 2.47 0.38 1.02 1.72 0.16 0.65
n 190 187 186 422 416 416
M(SD)
Low 67.58 (9.46) 67.58 (9.46) 70.71 (10.38) 70.71 (10.38)
High 88.36 (7.18) 88.36 (7.18) 88.20 (9.25) 88.20 (9.25)
Low CTO 70.77 (7.14) 72.13 (7.17)
High CTO 79.61 (9.74) 82.49 (8.39)
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; *p < .05.
